Supportive and Antagonistic Behaviour in Distributed Computational Creativity via Coupled Empowerment Maximisation by Guckelsberger, Christian et al.
Supportive and Antagonistic Behaviour in Distributed Computational Creativity
via Coupled Empowerment Maximisation
Christian Guckelsberger1, Christoph Salge2, Rob Saunders3,4 and Simon Colton1,4
1Computational Creativity Group, Goldsmiths, University of London, UK
2Adaptive Systems Research Group, University of Hertfordshire, UK
3University of Sydney, Australia; 4The Metamakers Institute, Falmouth University, UK
c.guckelsberger@gold.ac.uk
Abstract
There has been a strong tendency in distributed computational
creativity systems to embrace embodied and situated agents
for their flexible and adaptive behaviour. Intrinsically mo-
tivated agents are particularly successful in this respect, be-
cause they do not rely on externally specified goals, and can
thus react flexibly to changes in open-ended environments.
While supportive and antagonistic behaviour is omnipresent
when people interact in creative tasks, existing implementa-
tions cannot establish such behaviour without constraining
their agents’ flexibility by means of explicitly specified in-
teraction rules. More open approaches in contrast cannot
guarantee that support or antagonistic behaviour ever comes
about. We define the information-theoretic principle of cou-
pled empowerment maximisation as an intrinsically moti-
vated frame for supportive and antagonistic behaviour within
which agents can interact with maximum flexibility. We pro-
vide an intuition and a formalisation for an arbitrary number
of agents. We then draw on several case-studies of co-creative
and social creativity systems to make detailed predictions of
the potential effect the underlying empowerment maximisa-
tion principle might have on the behaviour of creative agents.
Introduction
If we peek into a painting class, we might observe teach-
ers prescribing certain techniques to tackle a task, and stu-
dents suggesting each other different brushes or materials to
achieve their goals. While the teachers’ behaviour can be
considered as positive but antagonistic, we understand the
students as supportive. Both forms of behaviour are closely
related to constraints. Constraints limit the space of possible
creative trajectories, and thereby make the exploration of an
initially vast set of creative possibilities feasible. This focus
also allows an agent to achieve mastery of some techniques
before approaching others (Stokes, 2005). Constraints also
present the challenge to achieve similar results by differ-
ent means. Overcoming constraints is the key to transform-
ing a space of possibilities, one crucial aspect of creativity
(Boden, 1995). We consider positive, but antagonistic be-
haviour as imposing constraints on another agent temporar-
ily, so they can learn to master them. When maintaining
constraints permanently, this can turn into harm, and lead
to the sabotage of other’s creative endeavours. Support in
contrast is present if an agent actively helps another in e.g.
learning a particular technique to overcome constraints.
We suggest that embracing such supportive and both pos-
itive and negative antagonistic behaviour could advance re-
search in distributed computational creativity (CC). Repro-
ducing such behaviour could not only improve our under-
standing of human creativity, but it could also prove to be
essential in the construction of genuinely autonomous cre-
ative systems. If we want artificial agents to be taken seri-
ously as partners in creative activities, we require them to
challenge us. In other words, we want them to constrain the
actions we can undertake, so we can practice the mastery of
the remaining and discover alternative routes. Likewise, we
want such systems to help us escape from situations where
we are very limited in our potential interactions with a cer-
tain medium. Negative antagonistic behaviour might allow
for the emergence of cliques and diverging creative paths.
The challenge of realising such behaviour in a distributed
CC system lies in finding a way to formalise and opera-
tionalise support and antagonism in an interactive and dy-
namic context, and preferably allow for the flexible and
seamless transition between these two modes. We need
to define these behaviours in a generic way, that allows
agents to act in open-ended environments without clear
goals, which are commonplace in CC. Such a situation can-
not be mastered with predetermined behaviour, and we will
address this issue by means of intrinsically motivated agents.
In this paper, we analyse existing co-creativity and so-
cial creativity systems as representatives of distributed CC,
and conclude that there is no means yet to foster supportive
and antagonistic behaviour in such agents without prescrib-
ing specific interactions, and thereby limiting the agents’
flexibility. We suggest to use the information-theoretic, in-
trinsic motivation of empowerment (cf. Salge, Glackin, and
Polani, 2014) to formalise the degree to which an agent is
constrained in a creative activity. As our main contribution,
we define the principle of coupled empowerment maximisa-
tion (CEM) as a generic mechanism to enable the emergence
of supportive and antagonistic behaviour in distributed CC
systems, without putting explicit constraints on the types of
interactions. Empowerment corresponds to an agent’s po-
tential influence on the environment at a certain time. Cou-
pled empowerment maximisation consequently motivates an
agent to act in a way which maximises or minimises this ca-
pacity for other agents. Importantly, it allows to seamlessly
shift between supportive and antagonistic behaviour.
Background
Co-creative and social creativity systems are only meaning-
ful if each agent has a different perspective on a shared
world, allowing them to complement each other, and for
creativity to emerge from their interaction. Only embod-
ied, situated and intrinsically motivated agents afford such
a genuinely personal perspective (Guckelsberger and Salge,
2016). We will briefly describe and motivate these notions,
and relate to existing projects in the field.
Embodied and Situated Agents
There is a common notion that creativity does not occur in
a vacuum (cf. Jordanous (2015)). It is a situated activity,
in that it relates to a cultural, social and personal context.
Moreover, and in line with Saunders et al. (2010), we sug-
gest that a large portion of creative behaviour, just like other
processes constituting intelligence (cf. Rosch, Thompson,
and Varela, 1992), is conditioned on an agent’s embodiment.
Put differently, we suggest that creativity is structured by
how an agent’s morphology, sensors and actuators enable its
interaction with the world.
Robots are becoming increasingly popular in CC research
(cf. Saunders et al., 2010; Saunders and Gemeinboeck,
2014; Brodbeck, Hauser, and Iida, 2015). Nevertheless, be-
ing embedded in the physical environment is neither suffi-
cient nor necessary for an agent to be deemed embodied and
situated. It is not sufficient because a robot could be gov-
erned by a central controller alone, following a classic com-
putationalist approach. In contrast, embodied and situated
agents must implement a tight interplay between physical
and information-theoretic aspects of the agent, i.e. between
the sensors, actuators, limbs and the controller. Pfeifer, Iida,
and Bongard (2005) note that embodiment is only given if
changes to one component can affect every other; moving
from a greyscale to a color camera sensor might allow an
agent to differentiate the consequences of its actions further,
potentially leading to more diverse behaviour.
We take the stance that embodiment does not require a
physical environment, so long as a virtual environment gives
rise to the same effects. Nevertheless, many studies employ
robots, because their situatedness makes the simulation of a
rich environment obsolete. Furthermore, a physical environ-
ment affords a more natural interaction between humans and
artificial agents. It also allows for morphological computa-
tion, where part of an agent’s computational burden is taken
over by its morphology, e.g. by constraining its joints. Saun-
ders et al. (2010) argue that taking advantage of the physical
world can expand an agent’s behavioural range.
Being embodied and situated comes with a restricted ac-
cess to the world, i.e. an agent can only perceive and af-
fect parts of it. This leads to the emergence of an Umwelt
(Von Uexku¨ll, 1982), i.e. an agent’s world of significance,
which shapes its intrinsically motivated goals or the way that
extrinsically motivated goals are perceived. Changing an
agent’s embodiment can change its Umwelt, and therefore
also the way it interacts with the world and other agents.
Pickering (2005) argues that this embodied and situated per-
spective leads to creativity when exploiting opportunities,
and overcoming embodiment-relative constraints in an envi-
ronment. We believe that this systemic view represents the
main motivation for distributed CC, over any mere engineer-
ing concerns. Here, creativity emerges from the interaction
of multiple agents, both human and artificial, with different
perspectives on the world, and on potentially shared tasks.
Embodied and situated agents also challenge the mini-me
problem in CC, i.e. the problem that creativity is often at-
tributed to the designer instead of the artificial agent. The
behavioural complexity of embodied and situated agents is
to a large extent determined by their interaction with the en-
vironment. Instead of explicitly programming, we have to
engineer for emergence, leading to more robust behaviour
which might be novel and surprising even for the designer.
Intrinsic Motivation
Pickering (2005) argues that human creativity cannot be
properly understood, or modelled, without an account of
how it emerges from the encounter between the world
and intrinsically active, exploratory and productively play-
ful agents. Intrinsic motivation was first named by White
(1959) while observing animals engaging in such behaviours
in the absence of an obvious reinforcement or reward. Ryan
and Deci define the term from a psychological point of
view as “Performing an activity for its inherent satisfac-
tions rather than for some separable consequence” (Ryan
and Deci, 2000). Being extrinsically motivated in contrast
means to perform an activity for an externally prompted,
instrumental value. Oudeyer and Kaplan (2008) comple-
ment this view with a definition informed by robotics and
AI. The converging point is the reliance on the sensorimo-
tor flow and agent-internal experience alone, independent of
the involved channels’ semantics. Intrinsically motivated
agents are not dependent on externally defined goals, but
can still form goals intrinsically. This allows for higher flex-
ibility and adaptivity especially in open-ended environments
which are commonplace in creative activities. Intrinsic mo-
tivation was identified in philosophy (Kieran, 2014) and in
psychological experiments as an important factor in produc-
ing more creative artefacts (Amabile, 1985), by driving the
exploration of creative options.
Related work in CC focusses mainly on the notions of
curiosity and novelty, but also on surprise (Maher, Brady,
and Fisher, 2013) and expectation (Grace and Maher, 2014,
2015). In co-creativity and social creativity, models of cu-
riosity is particularly popular: Saunders (2007) developed
a system of curious design agents which evolve abstract art.
In Curious Whispers, intrinsically motivated robots generate
and play music to each other (Saunders et al., 2010). Mer-
rick andMaher (2009) employ curiosity to support the learn-
ing of tasks in adaptive characters in multiuser games. In
Accomplice, Saunders and Gemeinboeck (2014) establish a
playful interaction of curious robots with a human audience.
Co-Creativity and Social Creativity
In creativity studies, co-creativity refers to several people
contributing to the creative process in a blended manner
(Candy and Edmonds, 2002). In this paper, we will use
the term for the more specific human-computer co-creativity
(Davis, 2013), describing the interaction of one person or
multiple people with one or more artifical agents to generate
a creative product. There are many subcategories such as
mixed initiative systems, live algorithms and collaborative
AI for artistic tasks, each stressing different aspects such as
the order of interaction, time constraints, or the task con-
cerned. Much research has been done on robotic live music
improvisation, e.g. Ja’maa, a modification of the percus-
sion robot Haile (Weinberg, Driscoll, and Thatcher, 2006),
and the interactive Marimba player Shimon (Hoffman and
Weinberg, 2010). Other researchers look at co-creativity in
sketching: In the Drawing Apprentice system, a person and
a software agent take turns to add to a virtual canvas (Davis
et al., 2014). Jacob and Magerko (2015) investigate human-
computer co-creativity in dance and interactive art by means
of the Viewpoint AI system. Here, a human performer and
virtual agent collaborate to improvise movements in real-
time. A co-creative system which is less about artistic tasks
is the ongoing Computational Play Project, where robots
will eventually engage with children and toys in pretend
play, i.e. the “subsequent enactment of a narrative experi-
ence using physical objects” (Magerko et al., 2014).
Within CC, the notion of social creativity, comprising cre-
ative cultures, creative societies, and computer social cre-
ativity, refers to computer-computer interaction, i.e. groups
of artificial agents which produce and share artefacts. Co-
creativity thus represents the fundamental mechanism in so-
cial creativity systems, if understood as creative interactions
between purely artificial agents. There are two overlapping
perspectives on the use of social creativity systems: One is
inspired from research in artificial life and sociology, and
employs systems as testbeds for investigating social factors
in human creativity. Here, the produced artefacts are of mi-
nor interest (cf. Saunders and Bown, 2015). For instance,
Steels (1995) as well as Saunders and Grace (2008) study
the emergence of shared vocabularies and the formation of
agent cliques engaging in “language games”.
The second perspective is directed towards the develop-
ment of autonomous creative systems, and considers the
mechanisms inherent in social creativity, e.g. dialogue, re-
flections and multiple perspectives, as means to achieve this
goal (cf. Corneli et al., 2015). Such systems could produce
valuable artefacts, but their value and novelty might be in-
trinsic to the system, i.e. only meaningful to the artificial
agents themselves. They often draw on concepts from cog-
nitive science such as the Blackboard architecture which is
inspired by the Global Workspacemodel (Baars, 2005). The
latter expresses the idea that distributed sources of knowl-
edge or different roles, represented by competing mental
processes, can be leveraged to cooperatively solve problems
that no single constituent could solve alone.
The Blackboard architecture is particularly popular in po-
etry and narrative generation, but these systems struggle to
incorporate competition and cooperation in a flexible and
adaptive way. Only few implement a strong coupling be-
tween an agent’s body and its environment: The story gen-
erator by Laclaustra et al. (2014) creates stories by recording
the interaction of multiple agents with different roles. Eigen-
feld investigated music in social creativity, both by means
of the software agent ensembles Drum Circle (Eigenfeldt,
2007) and Musebots (Eigenfeldt, Bown, and Carey, 2015),
which other researchers can modify to produce a collective
composition. A physical realisation of an ensemble is given
by the 12 arm drum robotMahaDeviBot, where each limb is
controlled by one agent (Eigenfeldt and Kapur, 2008).
Social creativity systems usually employ at least one
agent to direct the flow of actions. For instance, Laclaustra
et al. (2014) define the role of a “director” in their story gen-
eration system, which sets new goals for the acting agents.
In the Virtual Storyteller, Theune et al. (2003) use a direc-
tor to introduce new characters and objects, give characters
specific goals, and deny them to perform certain actions.
Similarly, Eigenfeld’s ensembles employ a conductor agent
to control the composition (Eigenfeldt, Bown, and Carey,
2015). In co-creativity, the human is usually, but not always
in control and introduces goals into the system: Curious
Whispers encourages people to interact with the robots via
a synthesiser. While some take a traditional “master” role
in trying to teach the robots tunes, others act more passively
and try to learn from- and copy the robots. Our formalism is
designed to foster sensible agent behaviour in both cases.
Case-Studies
We conducted three case-studies to analyse if and how
present co-creativity and social creativity systems realise
supportive and antagonistic behaviour. We evaluated sys-
tems which situate intrinsically or extrinsically motivated
agents in a physical or virtual environment.
Curious Whispers Developed by Saunders et al. (2010),
Curious Whispers represents a society of intrinsically moti-
vated robots which generate and listen to tunes. The main
goal of this social creativity system is to investigate the ef-
fects of embodiment on creativity in a physical environ-
ment. Each robot is equipped with a pair of microphones,
touch sensors to avoid collisions, a speaker and four wheels.
The robots are driven by an intrinsic measure of interest-
ingness, which is quantified by mapping the novelty of the
current sensor input on a Wundt curve. Novelty is quanti-
fied by comparing how new percepts are encoded in a self-
organising map serving as the robot’s long-term memory.
The robots can listen to two sources of sound at a time, and
move closer to the one which is considered more interesting.
Saunders et al. (2010) suggest that engaging in social rela-
tions represents one crucial means of how embodiment can
foster creativity. In their system, such relations remain shal-
low: robots play their tunes when getting bored of listen-
ing to others, and might consequently be engaged by other
robots which find their tune interesting. The programmed
behaviours of the individual agents in Curious Whispers are
deliberately minimal, so any supportive and antagonistic be-
haviour would be an emergent property of the system. Ex-
posure to tunes biases the robots in the generation of new
instances. They thus appear to engage in mutual support to
explore the space of potential tunes as they are passed be-
tween and modified by each other. Nevertheless, there is
no apparent antagonistic behaviour, and at no point do the
agents act to directly influence the performance of others.
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Figure 1: Causal Bayesian network representing the interaction of a memoryless agent with the world as a perception-action
loop unrolled in time. Arrows denote causal dependencies between its sensors S, actuators A and the rest of the world R.
Shimon Shimon (Hoffman and Weinberg, 2010) is an ex-
trinsically motivated, robot marimba player which impro-
vises in real-time to a human pianist’s performance. It con-
sists of four arms which can be moved separately on a shared
rail in parallel to the marimba’s front side. Each arm has
one mallet for the bottom-, and one for the top-row keys.
A MIDI-listener attached to the electric piano and an ad-
justable metronome are used as sensors. The project imple-
ments embodied cognition by understanding music not as
a sequence of notes, but as a choreography of movements
constrained by the robots morphology. The performance is
based on different interaction modules which analyse and
react to the sensory input. Each responds to a different chal-
lenge, e.g. to react in time with the right tempo, or to play
beat-matched, synchronised and chord-adaptive patterns.
The description of a live performance sheds light on the
nature of interaction. Each interaction module matches
a phase in performance, and is addressed independently
through the human player who provides the notes, beat and
tempo. It lasts until a certain condition, e.g. a limit of
played bars, is met. This rigid setup, together with a preset
of rhythms and a pre-programmed crescendo finale, shows
that provided a time and stimulus, the robot performs a pre-
scribed set of hard-coded interactions to establish support.
At no time does it challenge the player.
Drawing Apprentice Davis et al. (2015) introduce a co-
creative system in which an extrinsically motivated software
agent and a person take turns to improvise line drawings
on a virtual canvas. The Drawing Apprentice is based on
a cognitive architecture inspired by Enactivism, which con-
siders creativity as emerging from an improvised interaction
with the environment and other agents. It differentiates three
types of awareness, which are associated with different lay-
ers of perceptual logic. The system receives a line input from
the user, analyses and adopts the perceptual layer the user
is currently in, and generates an improvised response. Each
layer focusses on a different scale of the drawing, determines
how and over which timespan the system will analyse the
user’s input, and puts constraints on the possible responses.
For instance, the local logic only takes the user’s last input
into account, and complements it by mirroring, scaling or
translation. The regional logic in contrast analyses a series
of past strokes and employs gestalt principles to group them,
while the global logic analyses the whole composition.
The Drawing Apprentice reflects Shimon’s system archi-
tecture to some extent, as it constrains potential responses by
means of dedicated modules. Nevertheless, it autonomously
selects which module to perform. The system arguably sup-
ports and inspires the user in their activity, by complement-
ing their drawing in interesting ways. Nevertheless, the sys-
tem is explicitly grounded in such supportive behaviour by
design. Some responses might feel like a constraint to the
user, but the design does not seem to embrace such antag-
onistic behaviour explicitly. Being extrinsically motivated,
the system can only react in previously anticipated ways.
Summary The case-studies show us that present systems
with intrinsically motivated agents exhibit emergent and
thus highly flexible and adaptive behaviour, but do not have a
means to establish a truly supportive or antagonistic mode of
interaction. Systems with extrinsically motivated agents pre-
scribe such interactions rigidly, but are limited to what the
system designer anticipates as supportive in a certain situa-
tion beforehand, which is particularly difficult in a physical
environment without a clearly defined interaction interface
or fixed goals. Importantly, no project realises antagonistic
behaviour. Next, we will introduce the CEM principle to
overcome this situation. We later recall the case-studies and
show how the principle could apply.
Formal Model
We propose the CEM principle as a candidate mechanism
to enable the emergence of supportive and antagonistic be-
haviour in co-creative and social creativity systems, with-
out putting explicit constraints on the interactions. We first
provide an intuition and a formal definition of empower-
ment and the empowerment maximisation (EM) principle,
followed by a formalisation of CEM and an algorithmic de-
scription for a scenario with two agents.
Empowerment and Empowerment Maximisation
Empowerment, the quantity underlying the CEM principle,
is defined over the relationship between an agent’s actuators
and sensors, and as such is sensitive to the agent’s embodi-
ment and Umwelt. In a deterministic environment, empow-
erment quantifies an agent’s options in terms of availability
and visibility. In a stochastic setting, this generalises to the
potential influence of an agent’s actions on its environment,
and to the extent to which it can perceive this influence af-
terwards. Empowerment is measured in bits of information
(Shannon, 1948). It is zero when the agent has no control
over its sensors, i.e. when all actions lead to the same per-
ception, and it grows when different actions lead to different
perceivable outcomes. For simplicity, the interaction pre-
sented here is discrete in time and space. Nevertheless, con-
tinuous implementations exist and were evaluated both in
virtual environments and in robotics. An introduction to em-
powerment with a survey of motivations, intuitions and past
research can be found in (Salge, Glackin, and Polani, 2014).
At the centre of the empowerment definition is the in-
terpretation of an agent’s embodiment as an information-
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Figure 2: Perception-action loop for two agents (S1, A1), (S2, A2) interacting in turnwise order. The first agent (S1, A1) is
coupled to the second (S2, A2). Dotted (orange) lines indicate the estimation of future sensor states and dashed (purple) lines
represent the calculation of empowerment, which comprises further estimation steps.
theoretic communication channel. For any arbitrary separa-
tion between an agent and a world we can define sensor vari-
ables S and actuator variables A, as those states that allow
for the in- and outflow of information to the agent, respec-
tively. This interaction with the world is usually described as
a perception-action loop (Touchette and Lloyd, 2004), which
can be analysed by means of a causal Bayesian network as
in Fig. 1 and Pearl’s interventional calculus (Pearl, 2000).
In the figure, arrows imply causation between random vari-
ables: the agent’s actions A only depend on its sensor in-
put S, which in turn is determined by the rest of the system
R. The latter is affected both by the preceding system state
and the agent’s actions. The interventional causal probabil-
ity distribution p(St+1|St, At) therefore represents the (po-
tentially noisy) communication channel between actions and
future sensor states.
Empowerment is then defined as the maximum potential
information flow (Ay and Polani, 2008) that could possibly
be induced by a suitable choice of actions, in a particular
state st. This can be formalised as the channel capacity:
Est = max
p(at)
I(St+1;At)
= max
p(at)
H(St+1)−H(St+1|At))
= max
p(at)
∑
A,S
p(st+1|st, at)p(at) log p(st+1|st, at)∑
A
p(st+1|st, aˆt)p(aˆt)
Here, I(St+1;At) represents the mutual information
between sensors and actuators, which is based on the
difference of regular H(St+1) and conditional entropy
H(St+1|At). For details on these information-theoretic no-
tions, see (Cover and Thomas, 2006).
Empowerment is local, i.e. the agent’s knowledge of
the local dynamics p(St+1|St, At) are sufficient to calculate
the quantity. The information-theoretic grounding makes it
domain-independent and universal, i.e. it can be applied
to every possible agent-world interaction, as long as this
interaction can be modelled as a probabilistic perception-
action loop. This implies that it can be computed on arbi-
trary agent morphologies, and can cope with changes being
made to it. Finally, empowerment as presented here is task-
independent, i.e. it is not evaluated relative to a specific goal.
Crucially, empowerment does not measure an agent’s ac-
tual, but their potential influence on the environment. The
EM principle suggests that an agent should, in absence of
any explicit goals, choose actions which are likely to lead to
states with higher influence on the environment, i.e. more
options. A greedy agent would thus choose the action with
the highest expected empowerment, i.e. which most likely
leads to future sensor states with maximum empowerment.
Based on the properties outlined in the previous paragraph,
EM satisfies the criteria for intrinsic motivation by Oudeyer
and Kaplan (2008), which were outlined earlier.
Coupled Empowerment Maximisation
Coupled Empowerment Maximisation is defined on the em-
bodiment of multiple agents, and represents an extension of
the general maximisation principle. It is based on the ob-
servation that an agent’s actions might not only affect its
own, but also the empowerment of other agents. CEM rep-
resents an action policy which explicitly considers this re-
lationship. While we assume that an agent would always
maximise its own empowerment over the long term, we sug-
gest to look at how both maximising and minimising other
agents’ empowerment shapes the behaviour of individual
agents and groups. Given the general intuition of empow-
erment from the previous section, we hypothesise that min-
imising or maximising another agent’s empowerment estab-
lishes a general frame for supportive and both positive and
negative antagonistic behaviour, respectively. A positive,
antagonistic agent constrains others temporarily in order to
benefit them over the long term. A negative, antagonistic
agent in contrast maintains these constraints permanently.
We will define the coupled empowerment for an arbitrary
number of agents, but limit our examples to two. For sim-
plicity, we will also assume agents to interact in a turn-wise
order. Fig. 2 shows the extended perception-action loop for
two interacting agents (S1, A1) and (S2, A2). Here, agents
are considered as distinct from the rest of the world R. Due
to the turnwise interaction, they do not have to account for
their sensor states at intermediate stages where they are not
permitted to act, e.g. the second agent at t+ 2, and we con-
sequently omitted these variables. The diagram shows that
by performing a certain action at at time t, the first agent po-
tentially affects both the second agent’s sensor state at t+1,
and its own sensor at t + 2, which in turn also depends on
the second agent’s action choice at t+ 1.
CEM suggests that the active agent chooses its actions
in order to both maximise its own expected empowerment
and to maximise or minimise the empowerment of the cou-
pled agents. This is formalised by Eq. 1, the general action
selection policy. Here, parameters αi determine the influ-
pi(st) = argmax
at
[
αn · ±E[En]at + αn−1 · ±E[En−1]at + · · ·+ α1 · E[E1]at
]
(1)
ence of individual couplings. We use the notion of expected
empowerment here, because the active agent cannot be sure
about how the other agents might behave. The calculation
of coupled empowerment therefore involves several estima-
tion steps, which are illustrated by means of Alg. 1 and
Fig. 2. For the supportive case and two agents, the active,
first agent has to calculate the expected coupled empower-
ment of each of its actions at. As a first step, the agent
has to estimate which potential follow-up sensor states of
the second agent S2t+1 can be reached via at. The agent
then has to take into account how the second agent could
potentially act, in order to estimate its own future sensor
state S1t+2. This is indicated by the dotted (orange) lines
in Fig. 2. From there, the agent has to perform another
round of estimations in order to infer the local dynamics
P (S2t+3|at+2, st+2) and P (S1t+4|a1t+3, s1t+3), which even-
tually enable the calculation of both agents’ empowerment
(dashed, purple lines in Fig. 2). Finally, the agent has to
calculate the expected coupled empowerment E[EC ]at , by
combining its own E[E1]at and the second agent’s expected
empowerment E[E2]at , given the current action at.
CEM is not constrained to a particular number of agents;
nevertheless, the computational complexity grows exponen-
tially the more agents are involved. Note that this is not
problemantic if we employ several empowerment maximis-
ing agents e.g. in a social creativity system, as long as each
agent is only coupled to a small number of others. Different
means of optimisation exist, e.g. based on monte-carlo tech-
niques (Salge, Glackin, and Polani, 2014), the information-
bottleneck method (Anthony, Polani, and Nehaniv, 2014)
and deep neural networks (Mohamed and Rezende, 2015).
Algorithm 1 Calculating the action policy of the first agent
in a two-agent scenario, based on supportive CEM.
function pi(st, α)
for all at ∈ A1t do
Estimate P (S2t+1|at, st)
for all st+1 ∈ S2t+1 do
E2st+1 ← CALCEMPOWERMENT(st+1)
for all at+1 ∈ A2t+1 do
Estimate P (S1t+2|at+1, st+1)
for all st+2 ∈ S1t+2 do
E1st+2 ← CALCEMPOWERMENT(st+2)
end for
end for
end for
E[E2]at ←
∑
st+1
P (st+1|at, st)× E2st+1
E[E1]at ←
∑
st+1
P (st+1|at, st)
× ∑
at+1
∑
st+2
P (st+2|at+1, st+1)× E1st+2
E[EC ]at ← α× E[E2]at + (1− α)× E[E1]at
end for
Perform at : at = argmax
At
E[EC ]at
end function
Coupled Empowerment Maximisation in
Computational Creativity
Saunders and Gemeinboeck stress that intrinsic motivation
is at the core of the creative process, when agents engage
in “a reflective exploration of possibilities” (Saunders and
Gemeinboeck, 2014). Empowerment quantifies the possi-
bilities available to an agent in a certain situation in a very
generic way. Klyubin, Polani, and Nehaniv (2008) argue that
empowerment maximisation could be realised by, or even
help constituting specialised motivations, such as curiosity
and novelty which CC research focused on in the past. The
goal of this section is to provide an intuition of CEM and
motivate its potential in embodied and situated distributed
CC by recalling the previous examples and case-studies.
Supportive and Antagonistic Behaviour Revisited
We suggest that CEM establishes a generic frame for sup-
portive and antagonistic behaviour to emerge in distributed
CC. We already motivated the potential benefits of nega-
tive antagonistic behaviour in a social creativity scenario,
but not for human-computer co-creativity: Since a positive
antagonistic agent might struggle with determining the time-
frame for imposing constraints, e.g. in the presence of un-
certainty, we suggest to to use empowerment minimisation
in co-creativity as a shortcut for positive antagonism.
Davis et al. (2015) note that from an enactivist perspec-
tive, expertise in a field is not only about knowledge, but
to a large part about the mastery of an agent’s sensorimotor
contingencies (O’Regan and Noe, 2001). Maximising em-
powerment, either in respect to the own or another agent’s
embodiment, translates to developing more nuanced action-
percept couplings, and can thus be interpreted as maximis-
ing an agent’s sensorimotor expertise.
Empowerment maximisation is not goal-directed, and
Klyubin, Polani, and Nehaniv (2008) hypothesise it to be
a good policy in the absence of any explicit goals. Neverthe-
less, by coupling the maximising agent to other, goal-driven
agents such as the human collaborator in a co-creativity sys-
tem, or to “director” and “conductor” agents in social cre-
ativity, we can induce the goals of the coupled agent into the
active agent’s behaviour. We would consequently expect a
CEM-driven agent to either support or sabotage the current
goal of the agent it is currently coupled to. At the same time,
the maximising agent takes on some control, by influencing
the empowerment of the other.
Recalling the Case-Studies
This section illustrates how CEM can foster supportive and
antagonistic behaviour in the earlier case studies. One way
to affect empowerment is by constraining or widening an
agent’s options directly. An agent’s empowerment is maxi-
mum, if all potential actions are available and lead to clearly
separable outcomes. A positive but antagonistic Drawing
Apprentice could challenge the human co-creator by limit-
ing its toolbox to thick brushes only, or by restricting the
colour palette to cold tones. Shimon could maximise its own
empowerment by moving its mallets into a position which
allow it to react most flexibly to the pianist in the next time
step. It could support the pianist vice versa by playing a tune
which allows for many potential responses.
Empowerment can also be affected by limiting the aspects
which an agent’s sensor can differentiate in the environment:
The positive, but antagonistic Drawing Apprentice might
switch the output of the virtual canvas to greyscale, while
maintaining the internal colour scheme. The human part-
ner would consequently perceive many colours alike. The
software agent would challenge them to practice Grisaille,
a technique of painting exclusively in shades of grey, which
was particularly popular among the old masters.
Klyubin, Polani, and Nehaniv (2008) demonstrate that
empowerment can serve as an immediate guide for sensor
and actuator evolution during an agent’s lifetime. This re-
quires the modifying agent to have access to the actuators
and sensors. In the Drawing Apprentice, the virtual can-
vas serves as proxy to the human’s perceptions and actions;
Shimon in contrast cannot directly access the perceptual ap-
paratus of its human collaborator. It could increase its own
empowerment by evolving its actuator to apply more force
to its mallets, allowing for a wider range of distinct sounds.
In Curious Whispers, the sensors and actuators of other
robots are also inaccessible. This scenario illustrates how
empowerment can be affected by modifying an agent’s en-
vironment. Here, it becomes most obvious how an embod-
ied agent’s behaviour is connected to its morphology and the
external environment, and how important different roles and
abilities are to distributed CC. In Curious Whispers, a neg-
ative antagonistic agent could disturb other agents listening
to a performance, by playing a noise which makes it impos-
sible to differentiate between the different sounds that were
originally played. Consequently, the listening agents will
not be able to pick up the exact tune for their own perfor-
mances. If the other agents were able to express a different
spectrum of tones, they would maximise their empowerment
by switching to the part which the antagonistic agent could
not disturb, eventually leading to the differentiation of arte-
facts. We can think of even more complex interventions: If
there were movable parts in the environment, a supportive
agent might improve another agent’s rehearsal by moving
these parts into a position where they block noise out.
Conclusion and Future Work
We suggest to understand antagonistic and supportive be-
haviour in distributed CC as imposing constraints on other
agents, and helping them to overcome them. We translated
the information-theoretic notion of empowerment to the cre-
ative domain to formalise the degree to which embodied, sit-
uated and intrinsically motivated agents are constrained in
their creative activity. We then defined the principle of cou-
pled empowerment maximisation as a means to enable sup-
port and antagonistic behaviour in distributed CC systems.
We used CEM as an intuition pump to demonstrate which
behaviours CEM-driven agents might exhibit in three ex-
isting co-creativity and social creativity systems. Although
this is one possible application, the strength of CEM lies in
its capacity to allow for the implementation and subsequent
emergence of supportive or antagonistic behaviour online.
The emergent behaviour of embodied, situated and intrin-
sically motivated agents is often surprising, and hard to pre-
dict. The most important next step is therefore to evaluate
the formalism in an actual co-creativity or social creativ-
ity system, and to investigate the effects under experimen-
tal conditions. The examples in this paper focus on agents
in a common sense. Nevertheless, we are also interested
in applying CEM to scenarios where agency is attributed
to objects. This might allow us to evolve artefacts to com-
pete with others, or to maximise synergistic effects. Our
research yielded a strong correspondence between the envi-
ronment that an agent can act upon, and the notion of con-
ceptual spaces. As part of future work, we want to investi-
gate more thoroughly how (coupled) empowerment maximi-
sation relates to the exploration and transformation of con-
ceptual spaces. We only considered “constraints” in terms
of which actions are possible for an agent in a certain situa-
tion. Nevertheless, in many creative processes, options can
also be limited by what is desireable, e.g. from an aesthet-
ics point of view. Integrating such “soft constraints” into the
formalism represents another, promising avenue of research.
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